Individual Factors in Suicide Terrorims - "Fictive Kin" in Suicide Terrorism by Atran, Scott
Individual Factors in Suicide Terrorims - ”Fictive Kin”
in Suicide Terrorism
Scott Atran
To cite this version:
Scott Atran. Individual Factors in Suicide Terrorims - ”Fictive Kin” in Suicide Terrorism.
Science, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2004, 304 (5667), pp.48-51.
<ijn 00000480>
HAL Id: ijn 00000480
http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn 00000480
Submitted on 9 Apr 2004
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
2 APRIL 2004 VOL 304 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org46
C
RE
D
IT
:V
IR
G
IN
IA
 IN
ST
IT
U
TE
 O
F 
M
A
RI
N
E 
SC
IE
N
C
E
Ongoing Controversy
over Pfiesteria
READERS OF J. KAISER’S ARTICLE “THE
Pfiesteria conundrum: More study, less
certainty” (News of the Week, 2 Jan., p. 25)
may have missed the fact that there is more
certainty, not less, about the toxic microbe
Pfiesteria. Some Virginia Institute of Marine
Science (VIMS) scientists and their collabo-
rators had earlier concluded that Pfiesteria as
a whole is not toxigenic and only physically
attacks fish (1, 2), based on one strain of P.
shumwayae, CCMP2089. Yet Pfiesteria has
nontoxic as well as toxic strains (3), and
expression of toxicity by toxic strains depends
on culture conditions (4). Other laboratories
have now shown that when cultured and
tested appropriately (5, 6), strain CCMP2089
is ichthyotoxic. 
Kaiser states that I declined to send
these VIMS scientists toxic Pfiesteria
culture. I had offered to provide them toxic
culture and to show them how to grow it to
express toxicity, if they would support the
cost. Kaiser also describes me as not
providing toxic Pfiesteria to the research
community in general, although I have
provided it to more than 40 scientists.
Kaiser does not mention the two recent
publications on Pfiesteria effects on fish
and mammals: A highly toxic Pfiesteria
strain killed shellfish larvae as a toxic
effect, without physical contact (7), and
Pfiesteria toxin caused hippocampal
damage in rats (8). Kaiser mentions only
an unpublished study that, logically, found
no evidence of health impacts from
Pfiesteria because there were no toxic
Pfiesteria blooms during the study. 
Kaiser credits the VIMS scientists (1) for
having found that Pfiesteria can kill larval
finfish by physical attack, which colleagues
and I had earlier published [(4), p. 200], and
she asserts that I have attributed fish death
from Pfiesteria only to toxin. I have described
physical attack and toxin as important interac-
tive factors [(9), p. 672]. 
Kaiser reports only negative findings about
Pfiesteria amoebae. She mentions a study by
Litaker et al. (10), who did not find amoebae
in two P. piscicida strains (cultures 2 to 10
years old, of uncertain toxicity status) and, on
that basis, concluded that the species does not
form amoebae. She does not mention a peer-
reviewed paper (11) with corrective informa-
tion: Amoebae are minor to the toxicity issue;
toxin is produced mostly by flagellated stages.
Cultured toxic strains mostly have formed
amoebae within the first few months after
field isolation, and nontoxic strains rarely
form amoebae. Kaiser describes a workshop
presentation by P. Gillevet (VA Common-
wealth Univ.), who did not find Pfiesteria
amoebae in some estuarine sediments. She
does not mention recent research from an
international conference presentation: P.
Rublee (University of North Carolina) tested
estuarine sediments and obtained a positive
signal for Pfiesteria by PCR. Amoebae 
from those sediments were cloned by my labo-
ratory, cultured for eight weeks with crypto-
phyte prey in the absence of other Pfiesteria
stages, and sent to Rublee, who
confirmed them as Pfiesteria
amoebae with PCR. Rublee then
amplified and cloned 18S rDNA 
fragments, which were sequenced 
by another laboratory. The amoebae
sequence was a perfect match to 
the sequence for P. piscicida zoo-
spores (12).
Kaiser consistently fails to
include new findings that are actu-
ally about toxic Pfiesteria, or does
not emphasize their significance.
The facts remain: Pfiesteria species
have toxic strains. Their toxin
adversely affects fish and mammals
(5–8, 13). Further study is impor-
tant, because it will provide the tools
needed by resource managers and public
health officials to mitigate impacts when
there are more toxic Pfiesteria blooms. 
JOANN BURKHOLDER
Center for Applied Aquatic Ecology, North Carolina
State University, 620 Hutton Street, Suite 104,
Raleigh, NC 27606, USA.
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Response
MY REPORT STATED THAT JOANN
Burkholder’s lab had declined to share its
toxic cultures with “critics.” The fact that
more than 40 scientists have received
Pfiesteria material from Burkholder, but
certain other laboratories have not, was
discussed in a previous news story (News
Focus, 11 Oct. 2002, p. 346). For example, a
request for toxic cultures from researchers at
the University of Maryland was turned down
because Burkholder decided that the several
thousand dollars they offered was not suffi-
cient. The VIMS team sent a written request
for toxic cultures to Burkholder in August
2002. Burkholder responded that she
“cannot” supply cultures without also
providing “training to use them properly”;
this, she later indicated, would cost $40,000.
Burkholder instead suggested a collaboration
and sent VIMS a possible research plan in late
2002. According to VIMS scientists,
Burkholder did not reply to their response, an
e-mail sent 19 December 2002 that called the
plan “an appropriate starting point” and
suggested next steps. 
The “recent research” showing that an
amoebae sequence matched the sequence
for P. piscicida zoospores was presented in
October 2002, more than a year before the
meeting on which I reported, and has not
been published; Burkholder says this
culture was lost in a power outage. The fact
that the Burkholder lab’s attempts to isolate
possible amoeboid Pfiesteira in 2003
yielded only true amoebae species seemed
Pfiesteria feeding on fish epidermis.
Letters to the Editor
Letters (~300 words) discuss material published
in Science in the previous 6 months or issues
of general interest. They can be submitted
through the Web (www.letter2science.org) or
by regular mail (1200 New York Ave., NW,
Washington, DC 20005, USA). Letters are not
acknowledged upon receipt, nor are authors
generally consulted before publication.
Whether published in full or in part, letters are
subject to editing for clarity and space.
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worth reporting to readers of Science. Many
aspects of Pfiesteria research continue to be
controversial in the field (1, 2). 
JOCELYN KAISER
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Individual Factors in
Suicide Terrorism
IT IS PERPLEXING THAT IN HIS OTHERWISE
compelling Review “Genesis of suicide
terrorism” (7 March 2003, p. 1534), S. Atran
fails to address the most conspicuous case in
recent memory: the suicidal raids of
September 11, 2001. These events might have
provided empirical data to corroborate or
invalidate his model. Perhaps because all of
the direct perpetrators of the attacks perished,
it may have seemed wise to avoid any refer-
ence to them at all: The data would have been
indirect and anecdotic at best. Nonetheless,
the same could be said of most of the exam-
ples discussed in the Review: The scanty
evidence that Atran presents comes from
interviews with families, acquaintances, and
various recruiters of a handful of suicide
bombers in the Middle East, or from polls
surveying the degree of support that suicidal
terrorist acts receive in certain societies. 
The paths to martyrdom are diverse. They
require different abilities, talents, and
temperaments, and this also applies to
suicidal attacks. Rejecting individual factors
on the basis of a “fundamental attribution
error” (the tendency to explain behavior in
terms of individual personality traits when
significant situational factors in the larger
society are at work) can lead to another funda-
mental miscalculation: neglecting traits
robustly related to particular propensities or
temperamental styles. However obvious the
relevance of institutional factors to Al Qaeda
attacks, it does not obviate the need to analyze
whether the influence of peer pressure under a
closed organization fully explains the excep-
tional behaviors under scrutiny. Emotion-
driven loyalty in highly indoctrinated small
cells had to be uncompromising during the
preparation and execution of 9/11.
Apparently, the model works. Nonetheless,
the sheer elaborateness of the plan makes
these attacks very different from a low-cost
bus ride by a single youth carrying a home-
made bomb under his (or, less commonly,
her) belt, with the aim of detonating the arti-
fact in a crowded marketplace. For the former,
you need highly trained and reliable soldiers;
for the latter, any indoctrinated believer will
do (hence the wide sociodemographic vari-
ability in the studied samples). 
Self-recruitment, for instance, is an indi-
vidual factor that characterizes members of
violent doctrinal groups, although it is not a
distinctive feature among their members:
fellow devotees, intermediate officers, and
commanders typically share this attribute,
which may be connected to biological procliv-
ities (1). But there are other constitutionally
based traits (dominance, proneness to risk-
taking, fearlessness, aggressiveness, machi-
avellianism, narcissism, and obedience) that
may make a contribution to the different roles
played by self-recruited members, which in
turn are crucial for the ties they establish
within their microsocieties as well as the
tactics they employ. To put it another way, can
the sole trait of “charisma” explain the excep-
tional influence of unique leaders (2)? Some
charismatic leaders commonly succeed in
promoting highly prosocial and nondestruc-
tive goals; others are able to push entire
groups of followers into mass suicide without
injuring anybody else outside the group; and
still others lead highly cohesive parties to
challenge political power using terror
(suicidal or not). 
We need to dissect profiles that may char-
acterize the different temperamental styles
and goals of terrorism militants. Individual-
oriented research seems essential in this
respect. In addition to the aforementioned
traits, altruistic punishment (3), messianism
(4), and religiosity (5, 6) are factors that may
play important roles in the phenomenon of
suicidal terrorism. Research efforts directed
at disentangling the critical social vectors of
suicidal terrorism are extremely important.
They can, however, become even more valu-
able if individuals are taken into account,
rather than rejecting the perspective out of
hand just because there is an absence of clear
links with psychopathology or the lack of
reliable differences between introverts and
extroverts (7).
ADOLF TOBEÑA
Unit of Medical Psychology, Institute of
Neurosciences, Department of Psychiatry and
Forensic Medicine, Autonomous University of
Barcelona, Campus of Bellaterra, 08193 Barcelona,
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Response
TOBEÑA RAISES TWO CONCERNS ABOUT MY
Review “Genesis of suicide terrorism”
(GST): Data stem largely from interviews
and polls, and individual selection factors
may contribute to understanding, predicting,
and countering suicide terrorism. 
Such data are almost all that exist,
although new material confirms patterns in
GST (1). Information from Palestinian
news services on 171 militants killed
during 2000 to 2003 (including 87 suicide
attackers) reveals a majority of young
bachelors from multisibling families (both
parents living) having completed
secondary education (most Hamas suicide
bombers were college-educated) (2).
Terrorist incidents across the world (cited
by U.S. Department of State) are unrelated
to per capita income, whereas denial of
civil liberties (defined by Freedom House)
is related (3). U.S. Army Defense
Intelligence (DIA) officials interrogating
Saudi-born Al Qaeda detainees at
Guantánamo report that these militants are
often educated above reasonable employ-
ment level; a surprising number have grad-
uate degrees and come from high-status
families. Motivation and commitment are
evident in willingness to sacrifice material
and emotional comforts (families, jobs,
physical security), to travel long distances,
and to pay their own way (4). For Hamas,
Al Qaeda, and allies, religious indoctrina-
tion (of recruits who initially express only
moderate religiosity) appears crucial to
creating intimate cells of fictive kin whose
members commit to willingly die for one
another. As with the 9/11 attackers (5), no
“personality” defects seem evident.
No doubt, predisposing individual
differences render some people more
We need to dissect
profiles that may 
characterize the different
temperamental styles and goals
of terrorism militants.
Individual-oriented research
seems essential in this respect. ”
–TOBEÑA
“
Although both personal
and contextual factors
affect action, studies of
individual behavior in group
contexts show situation to be
a much better predictor than
personality.”
–ATRAN
“
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susceptible to social factors that leaders
use to get people to die for their cause. But
individual differences often singled out as
causally important—personal instability,
hopelessness, and poverty (6)—are not
dependable predictors (1). Tobeña
proposes additional personality traits as
possible factors (aggressiveness, narcis-
sism, and obedience). But a U.S.
Interagency report (used by the CIA)
concludes: “there is no particular psycho-
logical attribute… or any ‘personality’ that
is distinctive of terrorists” (7, p. 40).
Months—sometimes years—of intense
indoctrination can lead to “blind obedi-
ence” no matter who the individual, as
indicated in studies of torturers (8).
Traits conceived as cross-situational
dispositions are somewhat circular in
scientific reasoning. How do we know
someone is aggressive? Because the person
attacks when provoked. Why does he
attack? Because he is aggressive. In
contrast to personality traits, cognitive
attributions and appraisals (of how an indi-
vidual construes the situation he finds
himself in) may have explanatory value:
One can present the same event and manip-
ulate the attribution/appraisal of the event
to get different reactions. 
Although both personal and contextual
factors affect action, studies of individual
behavior in group contexts show situation
to be a much better predictor than person-
ality (9). One situational factor, according
to a U.S. Defense Science Board, is polit-
ical context: “Historical data show a strong
correlation between U.S. involvement in
international situations and an increase in
terrorist attacks against the United States”
[(10), p. 8]. In any event, we cannot do
much about personality traits, whether
biologically influenced or not. We presum-
ably can think of ways to make terrorist
groups less attractive and to undermine
their effectiveness with recruits.
GST sought to encourage new research
into what causes suicide terrorism so that
knowledge of causes could be used to stop the
killing and devastation. The final U.S.
Interagency report on combating terrorism
overseas shows funding increasing 133% from
2001 (apart from $165 billion voted for the
Iraq war, which was primarily billed as
depriving terrorists of weapons of mass
destruction) (11). Incidence of suicide
terrorism has not decreased. Despite detailed
review of actions related to tens of billions
spent by dozens of federal civilian and military
agencies, there is scant mention of funding, or
efforts to understand or prevent people from
becoming terrorists in the first place.
SCOTT ATRAN
CNRS–Institut Jean Nicod, 1 bis Avenue Lowendal,
75007 Paris, France, and Institute for Social
Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
48106–1248, USA. E-mail: satran@umich.edu
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“Fictive Kin” and Suicide
Terrorism
IN HIS REVIEW “GENESIS OF SUICIDE
terrorism” (7 March 2003, p. 1534), S. Atran
writes that institutional reinforcement of
evolved psychological dispositions may play
a role in the training of suicide terrorists.
These dispositions “may have emerged under
natural selection’s influence to refine or over-
ride short-term rational calculations that
would otherwise preclude achieving goals
against long odds.” In Atran’s view, commit-
ment to apparently irrational behavior is a
signal that convinces others of one’s sincere
willingness to act. Organizations that recruit
and train suicide terrorists purposefully
manipulate dispositions to such commitment
in order to engender or reinforce a willingness
to engage in suicidal sacrifice. However, it is
difficult to see how individuals could be
induced to commit acts so personally costly
that they preclude the fitness benefits that
signaling is presumably evolved to provide.
Only if commitment to suicide occurs in the
context of kin and psychological dispositions
related to kin-related altruism is successful
manipulation plausible.
I have developed a model to explore the
relationship between nonkin altruism and
institutional practices related to kin recog-
nition. Its logic is straightforward: Kin
recognition is a necessary component of
inclusive fitness calculations related to
altruistic behavior in many species, and kin
are often identified by means of evolved
cues that are open to manipulation (1, 2).
As recognizing kin has been an important
problem in hominid evolution (3), cognitive
adaptations to address that problem have
evolved (4, 5). Relevant literature suggests
that cues most applicable to human
behavior are close physical association
(particularly during development), pheno-
typic similarity, and the use of kin terms
and other symbolic kin referents (6–8).
Thus, institutions desiring to maintain and
reinforce nonkin altruistic behavior among
their members should attempt to manipulate
predispositions associated with these cues (9,
10). It is predicted that they will tend to
“cloister” recruits with each other and their
trainers, provide them with false phenotypic
matches such as uniforms and distinctive hair-
styles, and encourage use of linguistic and
other symbolic kin referents. Additionally,
because youth and separation from kin are
conditions likely to facilitate manipulation,
institutions should prefer young, impression-
able recruits and discourage their association
with actual kin. 
As suicide terrorism is an example of
dramatically self-sacrificial behavior often
exhibited in institutional contexts, the
model should apply to this behavior as
well, and a preliminary review of available
data suggests that it does. Atran describes
two of the five predicted practices: Suicide
terrorists are typically young (early twen-
ties), and they are recruited and trained
even younger. Parental and sibling kin
terms are often used among recruits,
trainers, and leaders. In addition, recruits
are typically separated from kin and
community to train in secret, isolated
camps where uniforms and other markers
of phenotypic similarity are common. For
example, among the “Children of the
Iman” in 1980s Iran, young boys and girls
were selected for martyrdom and sent to
isolated camps for training. They “no
longer belong[ed] to their respective fami-
lies,” were assigned uniforms and red
headbands, and were referred to as brothers
and sisters, and children of the Ayatollah
[(11), p. 91]. The same pattern can be seen
among recruits to Al Qaeda, where kinship
imagery is particularly pronounced: Osama
bin Laden is known as the “elder brother,”
and recruits are placed in “families” during
training and deployment (12).
It is no accident that suicide terrorists
are often compared to monks (13) or
members of religious cults (14), or that the
organizational structure of suicide terrorist
L E T T E R S
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camps mirrors that of military organiza-
tions (15). Costly sacrifice in nonkin
contexts is the key to understanding
commitment and behavior in all of these
institutions. And while what motivates
particular individuals to commit suicide
terrorism may be impossible to ascertain,
how institutions maintain and reinforce a
willingness to do so can be more clearly
understood. Atran is to be commended for
his exploration of this question in evolu-
tionary psychological terms. One hopes
that work on kin-cue manipulative institu-
tional practices will contribute to further
understanding in this area. 
HECTOR N. QIRKO
Department of Anthropology, University of
Tennessee, South Stadium Hall 250, Knoxville, TN
37996–0720, USA. E-mail: hqirko@utk.edu
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Response
QIRKO ARGUES THAT SUICIDE TERRORISM’S
equation of sincere displays of willingness-
to-die-rather-than-submit with actual acts
of dying-to-kill enemies nullifies any
evolutionary benefits in such displays.
Only by translating personal cost into
calculations of inclusive fitness (sacri-
ficing for kin) can we understand such
behavior. Martyr-sponsoring organizations
do this by indoctrinating recruits into inti-
mate cells of “fictive kin,” which triggers a
naturally selected disposition for kin
altruism. Qirko elaborates on how this may
be done, suggesting that sexual abstinence,
cloistering, and sharing of cult body
symbols facilitate manipulation. 
These practices, which are manipulated
to trigger naturally selected cues associated
with kin selection, can indeed encourage
fictive kinship, but are not sufficient or
necessary for terrorism. French foreign
legionnaires exhibit Qirko’s characteristics:
Candidates are stripped of names and
belongings and, through the tutelary figure
of Father Legion, a fictitious filiation is
established and identity restored. This
involves physical isolation from outsiders
and close training with comrades; tattoos,
stylized beards, and strict dress codes; and
songs, fetishes, and bonding ceremonies
(1). In terrorist groups, sexual promiscuity
can also be a bonding factor, either within
the group or toward others. Also, clois-
tering and cultlike behaviors may be more
prevalent among ideologically driven
terrorist organizations than grievance-
driven ones (which are more thoroughly
enmeshed in the local community that
sustains them).
In Moslem lands, exploding youth popu-
lations crash against rigidly authoritarian
regimes in the competition for political and
economic opportunity (2). These youths
and their families also see hope for escape
blocked by rapidly rising anti-immigration
sentiment elsewhere. Dwindling returns on
future life prospects for individuals trans-
late into increasing recruitment and prompt
returns for terrorist organizations and
leaders. To ensure returns, organizational
indoctrinators lead recruits through an esca-
lating series of commitments and entice-
ments, ranging from initial encouragement
of petty crime (3), to lures of Paradise, to
the “living martyr’s” final testament whose
retraction would make life unbearably
humiliating (4). 
This issue, too, may gain from evolu-
tionary psychology’s insights. The attempt
to monopolize social and economic
resources—most often by males, and
perhaps rooted in evolved reproductive
strategies involving sexual competition—is
arguably a factor in creating exploitative
political systems that are organized to
benefit those controlling resources (and
power) and reduce fitness in (and competi-
tion from) those who do not (5). The more
that people who are dominated face risk in
attempting to realize their hopes (6), the
more they tend to become aggressive and
tolerant of prospects for a shorter life (7).
Indoctrination into martyrdom converts
tolerance into desire, even necessity (8).
SCOTT ATRAN
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CORRECTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS
News of the Week: “Gene suggests asthma drugs
may ease cardiovascular inflammation” by I.
Wickelgren (13 Feb., p 941). The credit for the
image was incorrect. It should be “R. Spanbroek et
al., PNAS 100 (3), 1238 (2003).”
TECHNICAL COMMENT ABSTRACTS
COMMENT ON “A Reservoir of
Nitrate Beneath Desert Soils”
R. B. Jackson, S. T. Berthrong, C. W. Cook,
E. G. Jobbágy, R. L. McCulley
Walvoord et al. (Reports, 7 Nov. 2003, p. 1021)
reported a large nitrate pool beneath desert soils (up
to 104 kg N ha–1) and similarly shaped soil nitrate and
chloride profiles. Analyzing 16 new desert cores, we
found nitrate values at least an order of magnitude
lower (50 to 100 kg N ha–1) and no relationship to
chloride profiles. The generality of the deep nitrate
pool is questioned.
Full text at
www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/304/5667/51b
RESPONSE TO COMMENT ON “A
Reservoir of Nitrate Beneath
Desert Soils”
Michelle A. Walvoord, Fred M. Phillips,
David A. Stonestrom, R. Dave Evans,
Peter C. Hartsough, Brent D. Newman,
Robert G. Striegl
Desert subsoil nitrate inventories are spatially highly
variable. Smaller inventories measured in the
Chihuahuan Desert (particularly in areas of recent
desertification as reported in the comment by Jackson
et al.) relative to those in the Sonoran and Mojave
deserts reported in our study confirm that subsoil
nitrate retention in desert ecosystems is influenced by
precipitation patterns, vegetation type, and vegeta-
tion history.
Full text at
www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/304/5667/51c
